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Intellectual Reserve, Inc. v.
Utah Lighthouse Ministry, Inc.:
Fair Use, the First Amendment,
and the Freedom to Link
By MARY ANNE BENDOTOFF*
WE ARE FORTUNATE to live during these times of extreme techno-
logical advance. Convenience is gaining new meaning as our ability to
access goods and information over the Internet1 reaches unprece-
dented levels. While such freedoms associated with the Internet are
invaluable in our society, many now take these freedoms for granted.
The development of the Internet has not only provided copious edu-
cational and technological opportunities, but also the opportunity to
access and distribute materials protected by copyright law. Accompa-
nying this new technological era is a general sense that the traditional
rules governing copyright liability may not always apply where cyber-
space 2 is concerned--that "technology" somehow affords immunity.3
* Class of 2001. The author would like to dedicate this Note to her parents, Alan
and Donna Bendotoff, and to Nicole Bendotoff and Dave Robison for their continuing
support and encouragement.
1. The Internet has been described as "a network of networks." ACLU v. Reno, 929
F. Supp. 824, 830 (E.D. Pa. 1996), affid, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). It is a "giant network which
interconnects innumerable smaller groups of linked computer networks." Id. The Internet
is an international system, allowing tens of millions of people to exchange information. See
id. at 831. Information can be sent almost instantaneously to specific individuals, to a
broader group of people, or to the world as a whole. See id.
2. The term "cyberspace" is often used to refer to computer communications gener-
ally, including the Internet and online services. See Trotter Hardy, Property (and Copyright) in
Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 217, 217. Cyberspace has also been described as a "decen-
tralized, global medium of communications .. . that links people, institutions, corpora-
tions, and governments around the world." Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 831.
3. See, e.g., Electronic Frontier Foundation (visited June 24, 2000) <http://www.eff.org>
(describing the site's mission as: (1) upholding rights to digital free expression from politi-
cal, legal, and technical threats; (2) empowering people to maintain their privacy and con-
trol their digital identity; and (3) ensuring that systems are designed to respect people's
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A current dilemma surrounding Internet copyright infringement con-
cerns whether courts should impose liability for providing electronic
links4 to copyright infringing materials on other sites. Case law ad-
dressing this issue is sparse, 5 providing insufficient guidance for bal-
ancing new technology with traditional intellectual property law in the
linking context. Should liability for unauthorized linking come at the
expense of traditional freedoms of free speech and those historically
associated with the Internet?
This Note analyzes the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Utah's decision in Intellectual Reserve, Inc. v. Utah Lighthouse
Ministry, Inc.,6 prohibiting Web site operators from posting the URLs7
for three independent sites allegedly containing copyrighted materi-
als.8 While the text directing third parties to the allegedly infringing
materials in this case 9 was not hot-linked, 10 this situation is similar to
cases involving various types of linking technology." Part I of this
rights, such as free speech, privacy, and fair use); see also Lawrence Lessig, The Zones of
Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1403, 1407 (1996) (discussing the self-regulation of cyberspace
and how control in cyberspace is now exercised "through the ordinary tools of human
regulation-through social norms, and social stigma; through peer pressure, and reward").
4. For definitions and a discussion of the types of linking, see infra Part I.B.
5. See, e.g., Nicos L. Tsilas, Minimizing Potential Liability Associated With Linking and
Framing on the World Wide Web, 8 COMMLAw CONSPECTUS 85, 85 (2000); Nicole M. Bond,
Note, Linking and Framing on the Internet: Liability Under Trademark and Copyright Law, 11
DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 185, 192 (1998); Brenda Sandburg, Missing Links, THE RECORDER, June
13, 2000, at 1.
6. 75 F. Supp. 2d 1290 (D. Utah 1999).
7. A URL (Uniform Resource Locator) is the domain name of the server on which
the page is stored and its file path. See ABA, WEB LINKING AGREEMENTS: CONTRACTING
STRATEGIES AND MODEL PROVISIONS 53 (1997) [hereinafter WEB LINKING AGREEMENTS].
8. See Intellectual Reserve, Inc. v. Utah Lighthouse Ministry, Inc., 75 F. Supp. 2d
1290, 1295 (D. Utah 1999) [hereinafter Utah Lighthouse].
9. See Stephen Lesavich, Case Adds More Uncertainty to Web Copyright Laws, NAT'L L.J.,
Jan. 31, 2000, at C9.
10. Hot-link (or hyperlink) refers to the connection from one hypertext document to
another. See WEB LINKING AGREEMENTS, supra note 7, at 50. If the text were hot-linked, a
visitor to the Web site could "click" on the links and connect immediately to one of the
third party infringing sites, rather than being required to cut and paste the address. See
ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 843 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff'd, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
11. Links consist of highlighted references that give the user's computer the location
of other computer files located elsewhere on the Internet. See Dan L. Burk, Muddy Rules for
Cyberspace, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 121, 123 (1999). Framing occurs when the contents of a
linked site appear in a window or "frame," surrounded by the contents of the initial site. See
Maureen O'Rourke, Fencing Cyberspace: Drawing Borders in a Virtual World, 82 MINN. L. REV.
609, 633 (1998). The URL of the initial site continues to be displayed, rather than the URL
of the linked site. See id. at 637.
No legal delineation has yet been made between referencing the URL's of other sites
and providing direct links to those sites. See In the Courts, 9 CYBERSPACE LAW. 27 (Dec.
1999). Perhaps this is because the two methods of accessing another site are similar in
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Note briefly explores the history of the Internet, link technology, and
the basic forms of protection afforded to copyrights in the United
States. Part II discusses the district court's decision in Utah Lighthouse.
Part III explores the concept of contributory infringement and con-
siders possible methods for analyzing links to illegally copied material
that may be used to battle cyberspace piracy.12 It argues that ensuring
the rights of copyright owners should not come at the expense of the
freedoms historically associated with the Internet. Part III also assesses
the benefits of allowing links, and the feasibility of monitoring infring-
ing behavior. This Note concludes that not all linking to protected
content should place the link provider at risk of direct or contributory
infringement. In order to prevent a chilling effect on linking and use
of the Internet in general, courts should require more than mere link-
ing to impose liability for infringement. Suits alleging contributory lia-
bility for copyright infringement should not be used as pretexts for
stifling criticism or any other form of protected speech,1 3 and injunc-
tions should not be issued in such cases until a decision on the merits
has been made.
I. Background
Over the past decade, tensions have risen between traditional
copyright law and emerging technology. Debate has ensued over
whether, and to what extent, cyberspace should be treated differently
from conventional media.' 4 This problem continues, perhaps in part,
because "[i] n the visionary polemics of the Internet gurus, the Copy-
right Act is an embarrassing relic of the hard-copy dark ages, which
should be abolished altogether in the virtual utopia of the Internet.' 5
Those who have been involved with the Internet for years are now
frowning upon recent efforts to regulate this traditionally ungoverned
territory.16
terms of what the user is required to do. Hyperlinking simply saves the user time by remov-
ing the need to type the address into the Web browser. See Maureen O'Rourke, Fencing
Cyberspace: Drawing Borders in a Virtual World, 82 MINN. L. Rv. 609, 654 (1998).
12. "Piracy" refers to the "illegal printing or reproduction of copyrighted matter or to
unlawful plagiarism from it and to the unlawful reproduction or distribution of property
protected by patent and trademark law." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 795 (6th ed. 1991).
13. "Protected speech" refers to speech protected by the First Amendment of the
United States Constitution, which allows citizens to express their thoughts and views with-
out governmental intrusion. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 664 (6th ed. 1991).
14. See David Goldberg & RobertJ. Bernstein, Copyright and the Web: An EmergingDouble
Standard, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 21, 2000, at 3.
15. Id.
16. See, e.g., Electronic Frontier Foundation (visited June 24, 2000) <http://www.eff.org>.
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A. The Internet and Its Origins
The Internet is a global computer network with over 200 million
users.17 It is decentralized by design, and has been decentralized since
its inception in 1969.18 Each host computer is independent, allowing
its operators to choose between various Internet services. 19 The World
Wide Web ("Web") promotes the use of the Internet by helping indi-
vidual users sort through the mass of available information. 2" The
Web is a series of documents stored in different computers through-
out the world.21 Using a "hypertext"22 formatting language called
hypertext markup language ("HTML"), the Web allows programs to
display "HTML documents containing text, images, sound, animation
and moving video."23 As stated in ACLU v. Reno,24 "[t]hough informa-
tion on the Web is contained in individual computers, the fact that
each of these computers is connected to the Internet through [Web]
protocols allows all of the information to become part of a single body
of knowledge." 25
The Internet's history spans more than thirty years. 26 It began in
1969 as an experimental project of the Advanced Research Project
Agency ("ARPA"), and was at that time called ARPANET. 27 Initially
linked only to computers and computer networks owned by the mili-
tary, defense contractors, and university laboratories, the Internet
later evolved to allow researchers across the country (and eventually
17. See "Internet," Webopedia Online Dictionary and Search Engine (visited June 19, 2000)
<http://webopedia.internet.com/TERM/I/Internet.html>.
18. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 831 (E.D. Pa 1996), affd, 521 U.S. 844
(1997).
19. See "Internet," Webopedia Online Dictionary and Search Engine (visited June 19, 2000)
<http://webopedia.internet.com/TERM/I/Internet.html>.
20. See Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 836.
21. See id.
22. Hypertext is a system for linking information together in a structured fashion. See
WEB LINKING AGREEMENTS, supra note 7, at 7. Information can be linked based on a variety
of criteria, including the similarity or relatedness of subject matter. See id. at 1. Once an
object is selected, the user can see all the other objects that are linked to it and can move
from one object to the next. See "Hypertext," Webopedia Online Dictionary and Search Engine
(visited June 19, 2000) <http://webopedia.internet.com/TERM/h/hypertext.html>.
Hypertext systems are therefore particularly useful in organizing and browsing through
large databases that consist of disparate types of information. See id.
23. Id.
24. 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff'd, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
25. Id. at 836.
26. For a timeline chronicling the Internet's development, see Robert H. Zakon, Hob-
bes' Internet Timeline v5.1 (visited June 24, 2000) <http://www.info.isoc.org/guest/zakon/
Internet/History/HIT.html>.
27. See Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 831.
[Vol. 35
worldwide) to access and use the supercomputers located at a few key
universities and laboratories. 28 Throughout this period, the network
was a "self-maintaining series of redundant links between computers
and computer networks, capable of rapidly transmitting communica-
tion without direct human involvement or control."29 The network
was designed to automatically re-route communications if one or
more individual links was damaged, so that research and communica-
tions could continue.30 The system encouraged creation of multiple
links with each computer on the network to achieve a resilient com-
munications medium. 31 Similar networks began to develop during this
period as well, eventually linking together to make up what is today
known as the Internet or the "Net."32
B. Linking Technology 33
When attempting to reach a particular Web site, an Internet user
has several options. One such option consists of clicking on a
hypertext link leading directly from one site to another.34 Links are
short sections of text or image that refer to documents on remote





32. See id. at 832.
33. For purposes of this article, the term "linking" will be used in a general sense to
refer to the various methods by which a viewer can quickly access information from other
Web sites. For a thorough discussion of linking, framing, and related techniques, see
Tsilas, supra note 5, at 85. See also Lydia Pallas Loren, The Changing Nature of Derivative Works
in theFace of New Technologies, 4J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 57 (2000) (arguing that courts
should look to copyright law's fundamental principles in order to establish a set of rules for
derivative works in digital media); Committee on Computer Law, Caching on the Internet and
the Proxy Caching Notice Project: Avoiding an Internet Copyright Dilemma, 52 J. Mo. B. 968 (1997)
(describing caching technology and analyzing whether caching is copyright infringement).
Ted Nelson is credited with inventing the hypertext database system (the basis for
what we now refer to as linking) in the 1960s. See "Hypertext," Webopedia Online Dictionary
and Search Engine (visited June 19, 2000) <http://webopedia.internet.com/TERM/h/
hypertext.html>. Recently, British Telecom has claimed that it owns a patent (No.
4,873,662) on hyperlink technology. See Craig Bicknell, British Telecom: We Own Linking
(visited Sept. 25, 2000) <http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,37095,00.html>.
The company alleges it has owned the patent since 1989 and now wants to be paid. See id.
34. See Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 836-37.
35. See id. at 836. When a user selects a site by clicking on the text or image, the user's
Web browser reads the software code, finds the location on the Internet that matches the
address, and requests a copy of the Web page. See Tsilas, supra note 5, at 85-86.
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addresses. 36 Links can be created without any assistance or knowledge
from the owner of a linked site. 37 In fact, Mr. Berners-Lee, the origina-
tor of the hyperlink, believes that there is no need to ask before creat-
ing a link to another site. 38 Net etiquette or "netiquette" suggests that
one send an e-mail message to the owner of the linked site notifying
her that her site is being linked,39 but this courtesy may be an insuffi-
cient control mechanism as the community of Internet users grows
increasingly diverse.40
C. Copyright Infringement
1. The Copyright Act of 1976
The Constitution empowers Congress to legislate copyright and pat-
ent statutes. 41 Among the many powers granted to Congress is the au-
thority to "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries. '42 The Copyright
Act of 197643 ("Copyright Act" or "Act"), as amended, now governs
copyright law in the United States.4 4 The Copyright Act is intended to
provide an incentive to creators in the form of a monopoly in the
expression of their ideas. 45 It is not a monopoly in an idea itself, how-
ever, only in the way the idea is expressed. 46 Registration is not re-
quired for copyright protection under the Act. Copyright protection is
afforded as long as the expression is an "original work of authorship
fixed in a tangible medium of expression." 47 An expression is "fixed in
36. See Allison Roarty, Note, Link Liability: The Argument for Inline Links and Frames as
Infringements of the Copyright Display Right, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1011, 1014 (1999).
37. See WE LINKING AGREEMENTS, supra note 7, at 2.
38. See Tim Berners-Lee, Links and Law: Myths (visited Sept. 3, 2000) <http://www.w3.
org/Design Issues/LinkMyths.htnl>.
39. See Dan L. Burk, Trademarks Along the Infobahn: A First Look at the Emerging Law of
Cybermarks, I U. RicHi. J.L. & TECH. 1 (Apr. 10, 1995) <http://www.urich.edu/jolt/vlil/
burk.html>.
40. See id.
41. See MARSHALL LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAw 6 (3d ed. 1999).
42. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
43. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1101 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
44. See id.
45. See LEAFFER, supra note 41, at 6. The term "copyright" connotes "a negative right,
the right of the owner to prevent copying of his work." Id. at 3.
46. See Michael Landau & Donald E. Biederman, The Case for a Specialized Copyright
Court: Eliminating the Jurisdictional Advantage, 21 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J., 717, 723
(1999); see also 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994) (stating that "in no case does copyright protec-
tion ... extend to any idea.., regardless of the form in which it is described, explained...
or embodied in [a] work").
47. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1994).
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a tangible medium of expression" when its "embodiment in a copy or
phonorecord, by or under the authority of the author, is sufficiently
permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or oth-
erwise communicated for a period of more than transitory
duration. 48
Section 101 of the current Copyright Act defines "copies" as "ma-
terial objects, other than phonorecords, in which a work is fixed by
any method now known or later developed, and from which the work
can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either di-
rectly or with the aid of a machine or device." 49 There was once signif-
icant debate over whether viewing a document on one's computer was
equivalent to making a copy.50 While some continue to assert that
such viewing is not necessarily copying,51 the question was essentially
settled when the Ninth Circuit, in MA! Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer,
Inc. ,52 concluded that copying results when material is transferred to a
computer's Random Access Memory ("RAM") .5 Therefore, by exten-
sion, copyright law applies to cases in which one places a document
on the Internet without authority.
2. Direct Infringement
Copyright infringement entails ownership of a copyright by one
person and unlawful copying by another.54 The United States Su-
preme Court, in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service,55 spe-
cifically enumerated the elements a plaintiff must demonstrate for a
successful infringement claim: (1) ownership of a valid copyright; and
(2) copying of constituent elements of the work that are original. 56
Direct copyright infringement therefore occurs when defendants
make an unauthorized copy of a protected work. Copyright infringe-
ment is a tort for which all persons participating in the infringement
48. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. IV 1998).
49. Id.
50. Representations stored for only a fleeting period arguably do not meet the re-
quirement of 17 U.S.C. section 101 that the fixation be "for more than a transitory period."
Id. (emphasis added).
51. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, The Nil Intellectual Property Report, COMMUNICATIONS OF
THE ACM, Dec. 1994, at 21, 22.
52. 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993).
53. See id. at 518; see also discussion infra Part III.A.1.
54. See 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.01
(2000).
55. 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
56. See id. at 358-59.
Fall 2000] UTAH LIGHTHOUSE
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
are liable.5 7 While lack of knowledge or intent may affect the remedy
granted, neither is a defense to copyright infringement.58
Infringement concerns frequently arise where linking is involved.
While no reported cases forbid all linking outright, courts have pro-
scribed linking under certain circumstances. 59 Some commentators
have argued that a user may be susceptible to a claim of direct in-
fringement because she is making a copy of the protected material
when she clicks on a link and downloads6°1 a Web page.6' A more lib-
eral approach, however, suggests that "innocent" infringement will be
allowed if the user is unaware that the downloaded material is pro-
tected. 62 Yet determining such knowledge or intent can be extremely
difficult where the Internet is concerned. There is little to prevent a
person browsing the Web from claiming she was unaware that mate-
rial was illegally copied.
Immunity from infringement suits may also exist if users can
prove the material being copied was not protectable material under
57. See ROBERT A. GORMAN &JANE C. GINSBURG, COPYRIGHT CASES AND MATERIALS 752
(5th ed. 1999).
58. See id.
59. See, e.g., Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1873
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (prohibiting linking to any Web site containing a decryption system called
DeCSS which circumvents the protection scheme called Content Scramble System ("CSS'.)
and allows CSS-protected motion pictures to be copied and played on devices (i.e., com-
puter hard drives) lacking the licensed decryption technology); Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tick-
ets.com Inc., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1344 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (alleging copyright violations
related to a practice know as "deep linking"); eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp.
2d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (claiming links to auction items placed on defendant's site with-
out authorization were infringing owner's copyright); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F.
Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (granting plaintiff's partial summary judgment motion due to
defendant's operating a computer bulletin board service displaying unauthorized copies of
copyrighted photographs). But see Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Lerma, 908 F. Supp. 1362 (E.D.
Va. 1995) (awarding attorney's fees to defendant newspaper and granting its motion for
summary judgment after concluding that the newspaper's publication of portions of plain-
tiff's copyrighted materials fell under the fair use exception to copyright infringement).
60. "Download" is a term often used to describe the process of copying a file from an
online service to one's own computer. See "Download," Webopedia Online Dictionary and
Search Engine (visited Sept. 3, 2000) <http://webopedia.internet.com/TERM/d/download.
html>.
61. See, e.g., Tsilas, supra note 5, at 89. But see Samuelson, supra note 51, at 21 (ques-
tioning the interpretation of current law that electronic copies existing only in RAM are
"fixed").
62. The Copyright Act provides a safeguard for innocent infringers where the in-
fringer is not aware and "had no reason to believe that his or her acts constituted an
infringement of copyright." 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2) (Supp. IV 1998). In this situation, the
court has discretion to. reduce the award of statutory damages to a sum of not less than
$200. See id. The court in its discretion may likewise "allow the recovery of full costs ...
[and] may also award a reasonable attorney's fee to the prevailing party as part of the
costs." 17 U.S.C. § 505 (1994).
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the Copyright Act.63 Section 107 of the Act refers to material used
"unlawfully. ' 64 However, copying a work without the owner's consent
does not necessarily mean it was copied unlawfully. 65 To avoid poten-
tial liability, one may get the owner's permission to legally copy a pro-
tected work.66 Alternatively, a user may claim certain protections
afforded by the Act itself, regardless of whether the owner's permis-
sion was obtained. 67 One such protection is provided by the fair use
doctrine, a defense that allows a secondary user to legally make copies
of protected material without the owner's consent while avoiding in-
fringement claims. 68
H. The Case: Intellectual Reserve, Inc. v. Utah Lighthouse
Ministry, Inc.
A. The Parties
On behalf of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints
("Mormon Church" or "Church"), plaintiff, Intellectual Reserve,
Inc.,69 moved for a preliminary injunction to prevent the Tanners, two
long time critics of the Church, 70 from posting particular Internet ad-
dresses on their Web site.71 The defendants' conduct pointed Internet
users to three sites containing alleged pirated copies of the Church
Handbook of Instructions ("Handbook"), a book relating to the af-
fairs of the Mormon Church and distributed to Church members to
allow them to administer Church affairs. 72 Selections taken from the
Handbook were originally included on the Tanners' Web site, along
with information describing Church discipline and instructions for re-
moving one's name from the Mormon Church's membership list.73
The Tanners received an electronic copy of the material from an





68. See id. For a discussion of the fair use doctrine, see also infra Part III.B.1.
69. Intellectual Reserve, Inc. is a corporation that manages the Mormon Church's
intellectual property. See Lesavich, supra note 9, at C9.
70. See id.
71. See Utah Lighthouse, 75 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1294-95 (D. Utah 1999).
72. See Carl S. Kaplan, Copyright Decision Threatens Freedom to Link (visited Oct. 6, 2000)
<http://www.nytimes.com/library/tech/99/12/cyber/cyberlaw/1 Olaw.html>.
73. See Lesavich, supra note 9, at C9.
Fall 2000] UTAH LIGHTHOUSE
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
anonymous source.74 They said they were inspired by numerous re-
quests over the years to put the information online. 7
5
B. Procedural History
In October 1999, the Mormon Church sued the Tanners for post-
ing parts of the Church's Handbook on their Web site. 76 Claiming
that the Handbook was protected by federal copyright law, the Mor-
mon Church filed a motion for a temporary restraining order
("TRO") to prohibit the Tanners from posting Handbook materials
on their site. 77 The court granted the TRO, which required the Tan-
ners to remove all allegedly infringing materials from their Web site. 78
The Tanners later posted a notice on their Web site that the
Handbook was back online. 79 They included the addresses of three
other Web sites containing the Handbook materials that the Tanners
themselves were forbidden from posting.80 Apparently, no direct rela-
tionship existed between the Tanners and the people operating the
third party sites.8l The Tanners did not provide the Web site opera-
tors with the copyrighted material, nor did they receive any compensa-
tion for referring viewers.8 2
C. The Parties' Contentions
The Mormon Church contended that the Tanners would both
directly infringe on the Church's copyright and contribute to in-
fringement by others, unless the court granted a preliminary injunc-
tion.8 3 The proposed injunction would force the Tanners to remove
not only those materials copying verbatim from the Handbook, but
also the addresses of other Web sites where interested parties could
find the materials.84 In their response to the motion for a preliminary





78. See id. at CIO. The Tanners posted 17 pages taken from the Church's two volume,
330 page Handbook, which constituted about 10% of the pages in that volume. See id. The
total material posted on their Web site contained about 5% of the entire two volume Hand-
book. See id.
79. See Utah Lighthouse, 75 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1294-95 (D. Utah 1999). The notice read:
"Church Handbook of Instructions is back online!" Id.
80. See id. at 1292.
81. See id. at 1293.
82. See id.
83. See id. at 1291.
84. See id. at 1295.
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junction was overly broad,85 contending instead that only those items
directly infringing on the Church's copyright, and not mere refer-
ences to the other sites, should be prohibited.86
D. The Court's Rationale
The United States District Court for the District of Utah granted
the Mormon Church's motion for a preliminary injunction, determin-
ing that it was "in the public's interest to protect the copyright laws
and the interests of copyright holders."8 7 Judge Campbell found that
the Church was likely to establish that the third parties posting mate-
rial on the three referenced Web sites directly infringed the Church's
copyright. 88 Any viewers browsing 89 the sites would be making copies
of the protected work, and would thereby also be infringing. 90 Be-
cause the Tanners were actively encouraging others to view these sites,
they were likely engaging in contributory infringement.91 The Church
could thereby demonstrate the requisite presumption of injury neces-
sary for an injunction.92 The injunction required that the Tanners:
(1) remove the allegedly infringing material from their Web site; (2)
remove the addresses of other sites containing the material; and (3)
refrain from reproducing or distributing hard copies of the material
to others. 93
III. Analysis
While some copyright owners would probably prefer to view Utah
Lighthouse as condemning the process of linking in general, the deci-
85. See id. at 1291.
86. See id. at 1294-95.
87. Id. at 1295.
88. See id. at 1292.
89. The term "browse," as used by the court in Utah Lighthouse, means to call up or
open a Web site onto a computer screen. See id. at 1292 n.3.
90. See id. at 1294.
91. See id. at 1295.
92. The Copyright Act allows a court to "grant temporary and final injunctions on
such terms as it may deem reasonable to prevent or restrain infringement of a copyright."
17 U.S.C. § 502(a) (1994). In determining whether a plaintiff is entitled to injunctive re-
lief, a court will often consider the following factors:
(1) substantial likelihood that the movant will eventually prevail on the merits;
(2) a showing that the movant will suffer irreparable injury unless the injunction
issues; (3) proof that the threatened injury to the movant outweighs whatever
damage the proposed injunction may cause the opposing party; and (4) a show-
ing that the proposed injunction, if issued, would not be adverse to the public
interest.
Lundgrin v. Claytor, 619 F.2d 61, 63 (10th Cir. 1980).
93. See Utah Lighthouse, 75 F. Supp. 2d at 1295.
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sion is more limited. Because there has been no federal appellate
court opinion on the issue to date, the overall legality of linking re-
mains an open question. Instead, Utah Lighthouse is significant because
it explicitly held that actively encouraging others to seek out infring-
ing material on the Web (and providing the means to access it) will
not be tolerated. 94 However, it must be remembered that the Tanners
were apparently using linking technology to circumvent the TRO re-
quiring them to remove selections of the Handbook from their Web
site.95 Thus, the decision, if upheld, should be read narrowly to pre-
vent a chilling effect on one of the most valuable aspects of the In-
ternet.96 Furthermore, Utah Lighthouse should be viewed as a warning
of how copyright law can be misused to check otherwise protected
expression.
A. Contributory Infringement
Liability for copyright infringement does not end with the di-
rectly-infringing party. Although federal copyright law does not ex-
pressly impose liability for contributory infringement,97 the "absence
of such express language in the copyright statute does not preclude
the imposition of liability for copyright infringements on certain par-
ties who have not themselves engaged in the infringing activity."98 As
noted by the United States Supreme Court in Sony Corp. v. Universal
City Studios, Inc.,99 "an infringer is not merely one who uses a work
without authorization by the copyright owner, but also one who au-
94. See id. at 1294-95. Compare Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 55
U.S.P.Q.2d 1873 (BNA) (S.D.N.Y. 2000). The defendants in Reimerdes engaged in what they
termed "electronic civil disobedience" whereby they continued to support links to other
sites offering the very material (the DeCSS computer program) they were prohibited from
posting. Id. at 1876. The defendants were enjoined from linking to other sites with DeCSS
because, according to the court, the defendants "obviously hoped to frustrate plaintiffs'
recourse to the judicial system by making effective relief difficult or impossible." Id. at
1883. The court also noted that DeCSS was "created solely for the purpose of decrypting
CSS." Id. at 1888.
95. See Lesavich, supra note 9, at C9.
96. At the other extreme, however, it is important to note that a rule which tolerates
overly permissive linking to infringing material could encourage and support mass piracy.
See Carl S. Kaplan, Assessing Linking Liability (visited Oct. 6, 2000) <http://www.nytimes.
com/2000/09/08/technology/08CYBERLAW.html>.
97. See Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 434 (1984) (holding
that the sale of copying equipment does not constitute contributory infringement if the
product is widely used for legitimate, unobjectionable purposes).
98. Id. at 435.
99. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
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thorizes the use of a copyrighted work without actual authority from
the copyright owner. 100
The standard for contributory liability was set in Gershwin Publish-
ing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc.,' °1 where the Second Cir-
cuit stated that liability for contributory infringement is proper when
one "with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes or ma-
terially contributes to the infringing conduct of another."'0 2 Gershwin
involved an events promoter, Columbia Artists Management, Inc.
("CAMI"), which was held liable for contributory infringement be-
cause it "knowingly participated" in, and did not police, infringing
conduct by its artists who had performed protected works without se-
curing a copyright license.'10 3 Affirming summary judgment in favor of
the plaintiff, the Second Circuit concluded that CAMI was guilty of
participating in the formation and direction of the artists' activities to
the extent that it "caused [the] copyright infringement."'' 0 4
No contributory infringement liability can arise from encourag-
ing or assisting a party to engage in an infringing act when that
"party's use of the work would not violate the Copyright Act."'1 5 Thus,
to prevail on a claim of contributory infringement, the plaintiff must
show that the underlying copying violates the Copyright Act.'0 6 In
other words, there must be direct infringement before a claim for
contributory infringement can exist.
1. When Copying Occurs in the Computer Context: MAI Systems
Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc.
While many questions about copyright infringement still plague
Internet users, it is now widely accepted that, for purposes of copy-
right law, transferring material to a computer's RAM entails making a
copy of the material. 10 7 This is significant because if the copying is
done illegally, it can lead to direct infringement. The Ninth Circuit, in
100. Id. at 435 n.17.
101. 443 F.2d 1159 (2d Cir. 1971).
102. Id. at 1162.
103. See id. at 1163.
104. Id.
105. Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 964 F.2d 965, 970 (9th Cir.
1992).
106. See Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Communications Co., 24 F.3d 1088, 1092 (9th
Cir. 1994) (analyzing extra-territorial application of copyright laws in the context of unau-
thorized, domestic and foreign video distribution).
107. See MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518 (9th Cir. 1993). But
see Samuelson, supra note 51, at 21 (questioning the interpretation of current law).
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MI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc.,1' 8 examined a company's po-
tential liability for former employees who left their jobs with plaintiff
MAI Systems Corp. ("M") to join one of its competitors, defendant
Peak Computer, Inc. ("Peak").109 After four of MAI's employees left
for Peak, several of MAI's customers switched to Peak for servicing of
their computers.1 10 MAI then filed suit, claiming, among other things,
that Peak's running of MAI software licensed to Peak customers con-
stituted copyright infringement.' ' The district court issued a prelimi-
nary injunction prohibiting Peak from infringing MAI's copyrights in
any manner and from "using, publishing, copying, selling, distributing
or otherwise disposing of any copies or portions" of certain computer
programs belonging to MAI.112
On appeal, Peak contended it used MAI's software only "to the
extent that the repair and maintenance process necessarily involve [d]
turning on the computer to make sure it [was] functional and thereby
running the operating system."1 13 The Ninth Circuit relied on the dis-
trict court's conclusion that copying for purposes of copyright law oc-
curs when a computer program is transferred from a permanent
storage device to a computer's RAM.1 14 The appellate court deter-
mined this was consistent with the lower court's finding that "the load-
ing of copyrighted computer software from a storage medium (hard
disk, floppy disk, or read only memory) into the memory of a central
processing unit ('CPU') causes a copy to be made." 1 5
Peak also argued that the "loading of copyrighted software [did]
not constitute a copyright violation because the 'copy' created in RAM
is not 'fixed."' 116 The Ninth Circuit disagreed, however, concluding
that MAI had adequately shown that the representation created in the
RAM was "sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be per-
ceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more
108. 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993).
109. See id. at 517. MAI used to manufacture computers and design software to run its
computers, and, at the time of the lawsuit, continued to service its computers and software.
See id. at 513. Peak maintained computer systems for its clients, a large number of whom
used MAI computers. See id.
110. See id. at 513-14.
111. See id. Peak's technicians often used MAI's diagnostic software when they serviced
their clients' MAI computers. See id. at 518. The software was built into MAI computers and
was loaded into the computer's RAM when the machine was turned on. See id.; see also
LEAFFER, supra note 41, at 48.
112. MAI, 991 F.2d at 513.





than transitory duration,"117 as required by the Copyright Act. 118
Thus, MAI removed much of the ambiguity regarding when a copy is
considered to be "fixed" for purposes of the Copyright Act.
2. Inducing Another to Infringe
Mere knowledge that protected material is being copied is not
sufficient to warrant contributory liability. 19 Courts tend to look for a
deeper level of involvement on the part of the alleged contributory
infringer. t 20 In Sony, the United States Supreme Court noted that
under an earlier version of the Act, courts differed over the degree of
involvement required to render a party liable as a contributory in-
fringer. 121 It has been argued that "the addition of the words 'to au-
thorize' in the 1976 Act ... merely clarif[y] that the Act contemplates
liability for contributory infringement, and that the bare act of 'au-
thorization' can suffice."'122 Support for this position is found in the
legislative history of the Act:
The exclusive rights accorded to a copyright owner under section
106 are "to do and to authorize" any of the activities specified in
the five numbered clauses. Use of the phrase "to authorize" is in-
tended to avoid any questions as to the liability of contributory in-
fringers. For example, a person who lawfully acquires an
authorized copy of a motion picture would be an infringer if he or
she engages in the business of renting it to others for purposes of
unauthorized public performance. t23
The strongest cases for contributory infringement generally in-
volve a related defendant 124 with actual knowledge of the infringe-
ment who comes close to directly participating in the infringement. 125
Elektra Records Co. v. Gem Electronic Distributors, Inc. 126 is a classic exam-
ple of this type of contributory infringement. In Elektra, the defendant
117. Id.
118. See id.
119. See Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984).
120. See Elektra Records Co. v. Gem Electronic Distribs., Inc., 360 F. Supp. 821, 825
(E.D.N.Y. 1973); see also Sony, 464 U.S. at 435 (discussing how contributory infringement is
"merely a species of the broader problem of identifying the circumstances in which it is just
to hold one individual accountable for the actions of another").
121. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 437-38 (1984).
122. Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Communications Co., 24 F.3d 1088, 1093 (9th Cir.
1994).
123. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 61, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
5674.
124. As used here, "related defendant" refers to all situations where one can be held
liable for the acts of another. See LEAFFER, supra note 41, at 399.
125. See id.
126. 360 F. Supp. 821 (E.D.N.Y. 1973).
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music stores provided all of the necessary materials to allow store
shoppers to make infringing copies of musical works.127 The defend-
ants sold blank tapes, loaned shoppers original copies of the music,
and provided access to machines for duplicating.128 The district court
granted a preliminary injunction, finding the defendants had all but
directly participated in the infringement. 129 The defendants were not
only aware of the infringing activity, but were actively encouraging the
behavior.' 0
Sony provides an example of a more tenuous link between the
alleged contributory infringers and the infringing activity. In this case,
the contributory infringement claim was based on merely providing
the equipment necessary to engage in infringing activity.' 3 ' Sony con-
cerned the rights of home viewers to tape television programs on their
video tape recorders ("VTRs") for viewing at a later time ("time-shift-
ing").1 32 Universal's copyrights protected some of these programs. 3 "
Universal claimed that Sony, as manufacturer of the recording tech-
nology, was contributorily liable for consumers taping copyrighted
works off of commercially sponsored television.1 34 The United States
Supreme Court disagreed, however, reversing the decision of the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.' 3- The Court held that sale of the
VTRs to the general public did not constitute contributory infringe-
ment since the machine was capable of commercially significant non-
infringing uses. 136 It also determined that Universal had failed to
demonstrate a likelihood of "nonminimal harm" to the potential mar-
ket for their copyrighted works.'3 7 Sony demonstrates the continuing
uncertainty surrounding the level of involvement required before a
court will find a defendant guilty of contributory copyright infringe-
ment. It does seem clear, however, that a defendant who comes close
to directly participating in the infringement is in greater danger than
one who keeps a fair distance.
The Tanners' level of involvement can be viewed in several ways.
Like the court in Elektra, the court in Utah Lighthouse considered the
127. See id. at 823.
128. See id.
129. See id. at 825.
130. See id.
131. See Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 418 (1984).
132. See id. at 418.
133. See id. at 419-20.
134. See id. at 420.
135. See id. at 421.
136. See id. at 456.
137. Id.
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Tanners to have actively encouraged others to view copyright infring-
ing materials by bringing attention to the Handbook materials availa-
ble on other Web sites, thereby directly participating in the alleged
infringement. 13 On the other hand, the Tanners can be seen as pro-
viding information to educate others about the Mormon Church. By
posting the addresses of Web sites with the allegedly infringing materi-
als, the Tanners were providing sources in much the same way an au-
thor provides sources in a bibliography or footnote. The intensity with
which they encouraged others to view the sites can be justified by a
desire to inform.
B. Defenses to Contributory Infringement-Fair Use and First
Amendment Considerations
In Utah Lighthouse, the court concluded that the requirements for
a claim of contributory infringement were met.139 Surprisingly, how-
ever, the court did not address some viable defenses which would have
worked in the Tanners' favor. Both the fair use defense and the pro-
tection of the First Amendment would presumably have allowed the
Tanners' conduct to go unpunished. 140 Instead, important options
were left unconsidered.
1. Fair Use: Limitations on Exclusive Right 141
The fair use doctrine 142 is perhaps the most important defense
138. See Utah Lighthouse, 75 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1292 (D. Utah 1999).
139. See id. at 1294.
140. See Lesavich, supra note 9, at CIO.
141. Under section 106 of the Copyright Act an owner has the following exclusive
rights in her copyrighted works:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by
sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform
the copyrighted work publicly;
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the
individual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display
the copyrighted work publicly; and
(6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work publicly by
means of a digital audio transmission.
17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
142. Under section 107 of Act, notwithstanding sections 106 and 106A, "the fair use of
a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by
any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news,
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to copyright infringement available. 143 It allows a third party to use a
copyrighted work in a reasonable manner without the owner's con-
sent. 144 Despite being codified in the Copyright Act, the fair use doc-
trine remains an "equitable rule of reason to be applied where a
finding of infringement would either be unfair or undermine the pro-
gress of science and the useful arts.' 45
Four criteria are weighed in a fair use analysis:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such
use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational pur-
poses; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and
substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted
work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential
market for or value of the copyrighted work. 146
In addition to the factors enumerated, a court may consider
other factors such as lack of good faith and industry custom or prac-
tice. 147 More recently, courts have examined these factors in se-
quence, usually placing emphasis on the fourth factor, market
effect. 148 The factors are not always distinct from one another, so a
court's analysis can involve significant overlap. In fact, the United
States Supreme Court has noted that the factors are not to be treated
in isolation, but rather are to be weighed together in light of the pur-
poses of the Copyright Act. 149
In Utah Lighthouse, the Mormon Church accused the Tanners of
both direct and contributory infringement. However, even if the Tan-
ners knowingly participated in the alleged infringing activity through
their efforts to direct viewers to the infringing Web sites, the Tanners'
actions could be protected as fair use.' 50 Several factors work in the
Tanners' favor, particularly the first (purpose and character of use),
third (amount and substantiality of portion used), and fourth (market
effect). Industry custom and practice arguably favor the defendants as
reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or re-
search, is not an infringement of copyright." 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994).
143. See GORMAN & GINSBURG, supra note 57, at 609.
144. See id.
145. LEAFFER, supra note 41, at 434.
146. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994).
147. See Roy Export Co. Establishment v. Columbia Broad. Sys. Inc., 503 F. Supp. 1137
(S.D.N.Y. 1980), affd, 672 F.2d 1095 (2d Cir. 1980).
148. See LEAFFER, supra note 41, at 433.
149. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 (1994) (discussing fair
use in the parody context, and allowing 2 Live Crew's parody of Roy Orbison's song "Oh
Pretty Woman").
150. See Lesavich, supra note 9, at CIO.
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well. However, the discretion left to the court with respect to the good
faith element arguably favors the Church.
Under the first factor, the purpose and character of the use is
significant because the Tanners were arguably not copying with a fi-
nancial motive. Instead, they were providing portions of the Hand-
book as part of their criticism of the Mormon Church. 151 Mirroring
the language of section 107(1) of the Act, this use could be viewed as
being "for nonprofit educational purposes."'152 The Tanners' Web site
additionally provided instructions for removing one's name from the
Church's membership list.'I53 The Tanners could potentially have ar-
gued that they were educating others about the Mormon Church and
its practices.
There is a general presumption against the fair use defense when
a challenged use is for commercial gain, although a commercial pur-
pose will not conclusively negate a finding of fair use. 154 Many in-
fringement suits today involve copies thought to interfere with one's
commercial enterprises.155 By contrast, the Church Handbook at issue
in Utah Lighthouse was an internal handbook with a limited produc-
tion.' 56 These factors therefore appear to benefit the Tanners because
their motive seems to be more in the nature of criticism or comment
rather than an attempt to exploit a copyright for financial gain.
The nature of the copyrighted work is also relevant, since public
policy demands that certain types of works be more freely accessible to
the public.157 Accordingly, the "fair use privilege is more extensive for
works of information such as scientific, biographical, or historical
works than for works of entertainment."'158 The Handbook is just the
type of material the fair use doctrine demands be more freely accessi-
ble. As former members and long time critics of the Mormon Church,
the Tanners claimed to be educating others on Church practices and
beliefs. 159 Their Web site 160 contained information related to their
non-profit organization. 16' The Tanners were not posting the materi-
151. See id.
152. 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (1994).
153. See Lesavich, supra note 9, at C9.
154. See LEAFFER, supra note 41, at 434.
155. See generally cases cited supra note 59.
156. See Kaplan, supra note 72.
157. See LEAFFER, supra note 41, at 435.
158. Id. at 436.
159. See Utah Lighthouse Ministy (visited Oct. 7, 2000) <http://www.utlm.org>.
160. Stories and related materials are available on the Tanners' Web site. See id.
161. See id.
Fall 20001
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
als as part of a commercial endeavor, nor were they connected to the
third parties later posting the infringing materials. 162
The amount and substantiality of the portion used, in relation to
the copyrighted work as a whole, also factors into a court's fair use
analysis. 163 The Tanners posted only a small portion of the entire
Church Handbook on their Web site. 164 The excerpts were used to
explain Church practices and views, not to benefit the Tanners finan-
cially. 165 The Mormon Church's objection to the material being
posted likely stemmed from a desire to stifle criticism pertaining to its
group. A copyright infringement suit provided a vehicle for curtailing
this unfavorable discussion allegedly being encouraged by the
Tanners.
The effect of the Tanners' use of the protected material upon the
potential market for, or value of, the copyrighted work is also relevant.
Since the Tanners were not profiting from their posted materials, the
Mormon Church should have a more difficult case proving infringe-
ment. Presumably the Church was not selling the unpublished mate-
rial 166 for the exclusive purpose of making money. More likely, the
material was distributed to explain Church practices and to encourage
others to join the Mormon Church. Distribution of select portions by
the Tanners would not likely affect the potential market for the Hand-
book unless there was a market for it in a traditional economic sense.
More likely, the Tanners' activities could only lessen people's desire
for copies of the Handbook if they disagreed with the Handbook's
message. The Tanners were publicizing the Handbook in a way to al-
low people to come to their own decisions about its contents.
2. First Amendment Considerations: Preliminary Injunction-An
Unlawful Prior Restraint?
Pursuant to the Copyright Act, courts may enjoin certain speech
without violating the First Amendment. 67 However, a court must first
make a reliable determination on the merits that the speech falls
162. See Lesavich, supra note 9, at CIO; Utah Lighthouse, 75 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1293 (D.
Utah 1999).
163. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (1994).
164. See Lesavich, supra note 9, at CIO.
165. See id. The "information including how to remove a person's name from LDS
church rolls was posted for nonprofit, educational purposes." Id.
166. See id.
167. See 17 U.S.C. § 502(a) (1994). But see David E. Shipley, Conflicts Between Copyright
and the First Amendment After Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enterprises, 1986 B.Y.U. L.
REv. 983, 985 (discussing how the Copyright Act, a constitutionally based statute, appar-
ently authorizes the abridgement of a constitutionally protected right to free speech by
[Vol. 35
within the "copyright exception."' 168 Links to infringing sites may pose
problems in this respect if a court grants an injunction against linking
before making a reliable determination on the merits. Premature in-
junctions would allow copyright protections to interfere with First
Amendment rights.' 69 When a defendant raises a credible argument
that her use of copyrighted materials is protected as a fair use, she is
entitled to a full hearing on the merits of the argument before the
imposition of a preliminary injunction. 170
Considering that both the Copyright Act and the First Amend-
ment derive their authority from the Constitution, the rights that they
provide often result in significant conflict. Much has been written
about this perceived tension between First Amendment protections
and copyright law.17' Because links contain mixed elements of expres-
sion and functionality, a chilling effect in the linking context could
raise grave constitutional concerns. 72 The Fifth Circuit has stated:
"The judgment of the [C]onstitution is that free expression is en-
riched by protecting the creations of authors from exploitation by
others .... The [F]irst [A]mendment is not a license to trammel on
legally recognized rights in intellectual property. '173 The Copyright
Act therefore serves as an exception to the First Amendment right to
free speech,1 74 but only in limited circumstances.
prohibiting another's use of a copyright owner's expression). The First Amendment
provides:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibit-
ing the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, of the press, or
the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government
for a redress of grievances.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
168. See Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellec-
tual Property Cases, 48 DUKE LJ. 147, 169 (1998).
169. See id.
170. See id. at 213.
171. See, e.g., O'Rourke, supra note 11, at 647; see also Lemley&Volokh, supra note 168,
at 239. In the preliminary injunction context, this tension could have important repercus-
sions since the modern American legal practice is unquestionably more favorable to plain-
tiffs than to defendants, and it is even more favorable to plaintiffs in copyright cases than
in most other contexts. See id. at 165.
172. See Kaplan, supra note 96.
173. Dallas Cowboy Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Scoreboard Posters, Inc., 600 F.2d 1184,
1187-88 (5th Cir. 1979).
174. See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 417 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(referring to copyright law as an example of a speech restriction).
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Some commentators have noted that the use of a preliminary in-
junction 75 to prevent copyright infringement constitutes a prior re-
straint 76 if courts enjoin speech before a reliable determination on
the merits has been made that the speech does in fact fall within the
"copyright exception. '1 77 If Congress and the courts restrict speech
that falls within this exception, there is no First Amendment viola-
tion. 178 If speech is restricted before a determination on the merits,
however, First Amendment implications can arise. In this respect, pre-
liminary injunctions against posting URLs or links to other sites could
constitute a violation of the First Amendment. Such injunctions would
seem particularly susceptible to being characterized as prior re-
straints. 79 For example, in cases where a court grants a preliminary
injunction without entering into a fair use analysis, a user could be
barred from linking to material that is not protectable under the Cop-
yright Act. In these circumstances, it should not matter what role the
alleged infringers play in the supposedly infringing activity. Their ac-
tions should be protected regardless. The fact that some federal cir-
cuit courts have upheld preliminary injunctions without considering
the First Amendment cannot be accepted as precedent for the pro-
position that such injunctions are constitutional. °0 As stated by the
Supreme Court in Waters v. Churchill,'8' "cases cannot be read as fore-
closing an argument that they never dealt with."' 8 2
In Utah Lighthouse, the Tanners did not receive a full hearing on
the merits before the court issued a preliminary injunction. The court
175. This discussion refers to preliminary injunctions. Permanent injunctions, by con-
trast, are entered after a final determination that the speech is not protected, and are
generally viewed as constitutional. See Lemley & Volokh, supra note 168, at 169-70.
176. A prohibited prior restraint "is an infringement upon constitutional right to dis-
seminate matters that are ordinarily protected by the First Amendment without there first
being a judicial determination that the material does not qualify for First Amendment
protection." BLACK'S LAw DIcrIONARY 829 (6th ed. 1991).
177. See Lemley & Volokh, supra note 168, at 169; see also Neil L. Shapiro, Silence of the
Links: Lawsuits Intended to Curb Web-Page Connections Have Prior-Restraint Problems, L.A. DAILY
J., Nov. 4, 1999, at 6.
178. See Lemley & Volokh, supra note 168, at 212. But note that if the otherwise infring-
ing activity furthers free speech interests, then the First Amendment should prevail. See
Shipley, supra note 167, at 996.
179. The United States Supreme Court has expressed concern about prior restraints,
fearing that "communication will be suppressed... before an adequate determination that
it is unprotected by the First Amendment." Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on
Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 390 (1973).
180. See Lemley & Volokh, supra note 168, at 239.
181. 511 U.S. 661 (1994) (plurality opinion).
182. Id. at 678 (citing United States v. L.A. Tucker Truck Lines, Inc., 344 U.S. 33, 38
(1952)).
[Vol. 35
failed to consider, among other issues, whether the actions could be
protected as fair use. If the court had considered the prior restraint
issue, the Tanners may have also succeeded on a First Amendment
claim. In the future, courts should not issue preliminary injunctions
without first undertaking a more rigorous evaluation of these possible
defenses.
C. Suggestions After Utah Lighthouse
1. Limit Unwelcome Links, Not All
The controversy regarding unwelcome links has put the future of
all linking in jeopardy. a8 3 However, the problems experienced in a
relatively small number of transactions should not restrict use for the
hundreds of thousands that do not implicate such concerns. Links
have been referred to as the "signature characteristic of the World
Wide Web."'8 4 It has also been stated that "the power of the Web
stems from the ability of a link to point to any document, regardless of
its status or physical location."18 5 Much of the Web's appeal comes
from its ability to instantaneously link one site to another, and, in
most circumstances, linking does not lead to conflict. There is argua-
bly as much of a social benefit to the freedom to link as there are
associated costs.' 8 6 To protect their work, some copyright owners
choose to use linking agreements 18 7 to cut down on unwanted linking.
Others view linking as beneficial because it provides extra traffic to
the linked site. 88
Many believe cyberspace rules exist independently of traditional
intellectual property law. 189 Others note that copyright and trademark
laws have been adapted since the beginning to meet the changing
demands of technology. 190 It would be unfortunate, in this respect, if
183. See, e.g., Sandburg, supra note 5, at 1; see also Martin H. Sampson, Hyperlink at Your
Own Risk, N.Y.LJ., June 24, 1997, at 1.
184. Mark Sableman, Business on the Internet, Part II: Liability Issues, 53J. Mo. B. 223, 224
(1997).
185. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 837 (E.D. Pa. 1996), affd, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
186. See O'Rourke, supra note 11, at 649.
187. See discussion infra Part III.C.2. The barrier to entry that could result from a re-
quirement to seek permission before linking could itself operate almost like a prior re-
straint or undue burden on speech and should therefore be discouraged absent a
compelling interest. See O'Rourke, supra note 11, at 654.
188. See O'Rourke, supra note 11, at 644.
189. See Edward Rothstein, Swashbuckling Anarchists Try to Eliminate Copyrights From Cyber-
space (visited Oct. 6, 2000) <http://www.nytimes.com/library/tech/00/06/biztech/arti-
cles/10copyright.html> (discussing the "freedoms that were foundational" in the origins of
the Internet as a model for aspiration).
190. See Bond, supra note 5, at 188.
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numerous restrictions were placed on what was once envisioned as a
forum for free exchange of information and ideas. The United States
Supreme Court in Sony stated that "[flrom its beginning, the law of
copyright has developed in response to significant changes in technol-
ogy."' 9 1 The Court then went on to explain that "it was the invention
of a new form of copying equipment-the printing press-that gave
rise to the original need for copyright protection."'192 These pro-
nouncements demonstrate a flexible attitude toward issues involving
the interplay between technology and intellectual property. Such news
is encouraging because it suggests that future linking liability will be
limited, and the majority of "unauthorized" links may still be
permitted.
2. Employ Technical Mechanisms to Enable a Site to Prevent
Undesired Linking
Regardless of one's view on the appropriate level of regulation
required for intellectual property in the cyberspace context, the focus
must be on limiting only unwanted links. The troubles experienced in
protecting some authors' works should not produce an overall nega-
tive impact on the Internet. Where feasible, precautions should be
taken to avoid such impact. In many cases links are provided solely to
refer a user to other sources, not to exploit technology. Therefore,
utilizing available technology to bar only unwanted linking is impor-
tant. One method is for a programmer to write the Web page's HTML
code to recognize links from undesired sites and to refuse to process
them.' 93 Another option is to require a password for entry into a
site. 194 Although some of these measures would add an extra step to
visiting a Web site, thus cutting the efficiency of linking, many transac-
tions could remain unmonitored by owners of the linked sites. In fact,
Web site authors putting information on the Web often do so in
hopes of gaining a wider audience for their material. Monitoring links
to this type of material will remain unnecessary.
If these and other available methods do not provide lasting pro-
tection to copyright holders, it is the legislature's responsibility to pro-
vide an alternative solution. Commenting on the judiciary's
reluctance to expand copyright protections without explicit legislative
guidance, the Supreme Court in Sony stated: "Congress has the consti-
191. Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 430 (1984).
192. Id.
193. See O'Rourke, supra note 11, at 646.
194. See id. at 645.
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tutional authority and the institutional ability to accommodate fully
the varied permutations of competing interests that are inevitably im-
plicated by such new technology."1 95 The Sony decision, however,
dates back to 1984. At that time the legislature may have been able to
keep pace with technological innovations. Today the pace of technol-
ogy provides Congress an even greater challenge.
3. Distinguish Fair Use Criticism from Commercial Exploitation
People copy protected work for numerous purposes, some more
laudable than others. The fair use doctrine attempts to protect one's
right to the more worthwhile options. By balancing the need to in-
duce authors to create with the public's interest in the dissemination
of ideas, the fair use doctrine is solicitous of free speech interests. 196
"The doctrine permits a defendant to reproduce some protected ex-
pression for a productive purpose such as criticism or news report-
ing.' 97 The defense is not usually allowed, however, when the
defendant's use detracts from the use of the original, such as when it
is undertaken for a commercial or profit-making purpose. 19 When
protected material is used in this manner, it is presumptively unfair to
copy the material. It is therefore crucial to distinguish fair use criti-
cism from commercial exploitation in the linking context.
Criticism of the Mormon Church's Handbook in Utah Lighthouse
could arguably be considered fair use. "[A] copyright owner has no
right to prevent a newspaper from publishing a devastating review of
her new book, or even from using snippets of the book in the review
to bolster the critique."' 99 By analogy, one could argue posting copy-
righted materials should not be barred in situations like those
presented in Utah Lighthouse, if the, materials are used to "bolster [a]
critique." 200
There are valid arguments denouncing the exploitation of copy-
rights for commercial purposes. However, situations like those
195. Sony, 464 U.S. at 431.
196. See Shipley, supra note 167, at 994.
197. Id.
198. See id.
199. Lemley & Volokh, supra note 168, at 208 (citing Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music
Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 591-92 (1994)).
200. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985)
(characterizing the Copyright Act's distinction between copyrightable expression and un-
copyrightable facts and ideas-and the latitude for scholarship and comment traditionally
afforded by fair use-as "First Amendment protections"; stressing that it would be an abuse
of the copyright owner's monopoly for copyright law to become an instrument to suppress
facts).
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presented in Utah Lighthouse, where there is very little possibility of
profit from posting copyrighted materials on a Web site or linking to
them, do not fall in this category. If courts continue to ban the use of
material in this type of situation, there will be little hope of encourag-
ing the free exchange of information on the Internet. Thus, distin-
guishing between criticism and commercial purpose is imperative to
prevent a chilling effect on Internet use.
Conclusion
Utah Lighthouse provides important lessons for those who supply
links. The Tanners appear to have used linking to deliberately dodge
a previous injunction against posting allegedly infringing materials on
their Web site. Linking was enjoined in this instance because it was
perceived as an attempt to circumvent a court order. Thus, Utah Light-
house should serve as a lesson that exploiting technology in order to
avoid an injunction will not be tolerated. But, it should not serve as a
signal that all linking will lead to contributory liability. Links provided
in good faith should not pose serious problems, nor should the moni-
toring of links become a full time occupation.
Utah Lighthouse is an indication that where the Internet is con-
cerned, First Amendment issues still remain problematic. Aside from
the linking dilemma, the issue of criticism as fair use must be re-ex-
amined. Criticism has traditionally been, and should continue to be,
protected. Enforcement of copyright laws in an uncertain environ-
ment should not interfere with this privilege.
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